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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
In the Matter of the Estate of
OLIVE K. PETERSON, Deceased
SHIRLEY B. HIGBEE,
Appellant,
VIRGLE GILMORE and
EUGENE EDWARD BUTCHER

Case No. 12307

'

Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF CASE
The nature of this case is a will contest. This arose
in the District Court of Iron County, State of Utah, in
the Matter of the Estate of Olive K. Peterson, deceased,
Probate No. 2281. One Virgle Gilmore filed a petition for
probate of will, reciting the usual items therein. An objection to the petition for probate of will was filed
shortly thereafter by Shirley B. Higbee, a daughter of
the deceased, the petition having been filed 22 April,
1969. On the 28th of April, 1969, Shirley B. Higbee
caused to be filed a petition for letters of administration and for the appointment of herself as administratrix. A protest and objection to petition for letters of
administration were filed by the said Virgle Gilmore
shortly after the 20th of May, 1969.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After several settings, the two petitions were heard
by the Honorable C. Nelson Day, District Judge, on 28
May, 1969. The petitioner for probate of will was represented by Durham Morris, Esq. and Orville Isom, Esq.,
and petitioner for letters testamentary was represented
by Patrick H. Fenton, Esq., the undersigned. Several
witnesses were called by each side. Thereafter in a Mem·
orandum Decision dated the 7th day of July, 1969, the
Honorable C. Nelson Day made a finding to the effect
that the testatrix destroyed the duplicate will and did
so intentionally, and that under these conditions the
original will is deemed revoked by the intentional burn-ing and destruction of the duplicate thereof in October,
1968, and Judge Day ordered the petition for issuance
of letters of administration to Shirley B. Higbee to be
granted and set bond therefor, and sustained the objection to the petition for probate of will.
Thereafter, by document dated 15 July, 1969, Samuel King, Esq., made an appearance for Eugene Edward
Butcher, the legatee under the will, and made an objection to distribution and a motion for amendment of
judgment and order, or in the alternative, a motion for
new hearing, referring to Judge Day's order of 7 July,
1969. After being noticed of a hearing on 4 September,
1969, a motion for continuance of hearing on motion
for amendment of judgment was filed, and the matter
was continued to 9 October, 1969, upon conditions of
responsibility for damage being assessed against Eugene
Edwat:d Butcher, the legatee under the will, and the
moving for the continuance.
On 9 October, 1969, an argument was had on the
matter by various counsel. No additional evidence was
offered' by anyone, according to the best memory of
the undersigned. The only thing that was argued was

t
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the legal effect of the various statements previously
made by witnesses in the hearing of 28 May, 1969. This
hearing of 9 October, 1969, was held before the Honorable James P. McCune, District Judge, who took the
matter under advisement. Thereafter, on the 24th of
August, 1970, he signed an order appointing as Administratrix, Shirley B. Higbee, which was based upon
stipulation of counsel to the effect that she might be
appointed as Administratrix and go forward with the
administration of the estate, but that distribution was
held up until such time as the motion for rehearing had
been decided by the Honorable James P. McCune. Thereafter, on the 30th day of September, 1970, the Honorable James P. McCune made an order modifying Memorandum Decision which in effect reverses the decision
of Judge Day, and finds that there was no duplicate will
made and that no duplicate was destroyed, and orders
that objection to the petition for letters of administration be granted, and orders the appointment of Virgle
Gilmore as Executor.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant desires that the decision of Judge McCune
be set aside and reversed, and that the decision of Judge
Day be reinstated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the opinion of the undersigned, the facts are
contained in the short transcript of the hearing of 28
May, 1969, consisting of 38 pages. Appellant urges :i
complete reading of this transcript by all members of
the appellate court. The highlights and the facts as the
appellant believes they are presented therein are as follows:
Orville Isom testified that he made a will and that
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it was executed in the usual manner, Transcript Page
5, Line 1 to Page 6, Line 5. He further testified that he
did not know what Mrs. Peterson had done with the
will after she left his office until it was sent to him by
Mr. Butcher, Transcript Page 6, Line 24 to Line 29. He
further testified that he had no recollection of making
the will, Transcript Page 7, Line 28 to Page 8, Line 6. It
was quite apparent that he had no memory of the item
and was testifying as to the number of copies he made
from the usual practice, Transcript, Page 9, Line 13 to
Line 18. It is most interesting to note on Line 18 that
he said he "almost always followed this procedure."
According to Mr. Butcher, the legatee under the
will, the will was given to him in 1967 by Mrs. Peterson
and he left it with his wife's family and got it from
them and sent it to Mr. Isom after Mrs. Peterson's death,
for probate. However, the question that must be decided
is whether or not Mrs. Peterson destroyed the will by
telling her granddaughter, Mrs. Rollo, that she was burning the same, and burning what she said was her will,
and then later telling two people that she had burned
her will. The facts clearly show that she told the grand·
daughter she was going to destroy her will by burning
it, and the the granddaughter saw her burn something
in an envelope which Mrs. Peterson said was her will,
and that Mrs. Peterson later told two independent peo·
ple that she had burned her will. The actual burning and
the conversation with her granddaughter can be found
in the transcript, Page 20, Line 1, to Page 21, Line 16.
The discussion with the two people can be found in the
transcript, Page 24, Line 14 to Line 22, and Page 25, Line
8 to Line 15; pertaining to Mr. Miller, Page 28, Line 12
to Line 23, and Page 29, Line 24 to Page 30, Line 7, and
Page 35, Line 23 to Page 36, Line 2.
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ARGUMENT

Point I
MRS. PETERSON'S INTENT WAS TO DESTROY
HER WILL.
In the opinion of the undersigned, there is not a
case directly in point on this particular matter. We must
come to the conclusion that one of two things hanpened.
If Mr. Isom made a duplicate original and forgot same
and this was destroyed by the testatric intentionally,
then this act was a complete revocation under the provisions of Title 74-1-21, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and
amendments thereto, which read as follows:
"The revocation of a will executed in duplicate
maye bemade by revoking one of the duplicates."
If this was done, then certainly the provisions of Title

74-1-19 and 74-1-21 were complied with, and the will was
revoked. Certainly Mr. Isom's memory could be faulty
and was faulty without any question, initially. He admitted that he had no memory of making the will whatsoever, and denied having made same, initially. In
his testimony he was testifying from practice and not
from memory, as he freely admitted, and did admit that
sometimes he made duplicate originals. His affidavit obtained at a later date without opportunity of cross-examination, after he had admitted that he made duplicate originals and that he was testifying only from habit on this matter, cannot be considered as evidence in
this particular matter.
The other possibility is that Mr. Isom made only an
original and that it was either purloined from Mrs. Peterson's possession and something substituted in its place,
or, in her opinion she still had the will. This, she burned.
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What is the effect of this?
The law is quite clear that intent alone to revoke a
will without an overt act does not revoke the will. In
the opinion of the undersigned, many cases have been
decided on this line, and had Mrs. Peterson only intended
to revoke the will, but had done nothing toward its accomplishment, then this contest should not be in exist·
ance.
Point II

MRS. PETERSON'S INTENT TO REVOKE THE
WILL WAS FOLLOWED BY AN OVERT ACT.
As is always the situation in a case of this nature,
the testator is now not present to testify, and was not at
the time of any of the hearings. The courts involved in
this matter must therefore come to a conclusion as to
her intentions and what she did from the information
of third parties as contained in the transcript. It is sel·
dom otherwise in a contest of this nature. However,
Mrs. Peterson did either burn the will or burn something that she thought was the will. Under these condi·
tions we very definitely have an overt act which Mrs.
Peterson thought revoked her will, We have many stat·
utes as far as the construction of a will is concerned
that say give effect to the intent. This is true even of
conflicting codicils and conflicting wills. The Statute
itself, Title 74-1-19, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, indicates giving effect to the intent in the second part:
" ... by being burned, torn, cancelled, obliterated
or destroyed, with the intent and for the purpose of revoking same, by the testator himself
or by some person in his presence and by his
direction."
This statute combines two elements as requisite for
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an effective revocation of a will by destroying it; first,
the intent to revoke, and second, the overt act. The
statute by implication indicates that if a will is burned,
torn, cancelled, obliterated or destroyed without the intent of revoking same, it is not a revocation, and under
these conditions, in reversing this thinking, when the
testator does an act thinking she is destroying the will,
with the intent of revoking same, then it should be a
revocation.
As a matter of fact, most text material indicates that
only the intent plus any overt act is necessary. The following rule is found in 57 American Jurisprudence on
Wills, Section 460, Page 322:
"Necessity for Overt Act. - The earlier decisions in England that the revocation of a will
was merely a matter of intent and that an overt
act was not essential to effect a revocation led to
such uncertainty in the stability of wills, and to
such suspicion that wills were being defeated
by perjury, that a statute was passed defining
what was necessary to the revocation of a will
by the testator in his lifetime. The various states
of this country also have enacted similar legislation. Accordingly, revocation is, under modern
law, a combination of an intent to revoke and
an overt act, except in the limited class of cases
where it results by operation of law. It is an act
of the mind demonstrated by some outward and
visible sign of revocation. The modern rule is
that the revocation of a will required the
concurrence of an intent to revoke and of
some act destroying the will or making itself
manifest upon the face of the will, or the execution of a writing signed and attested in tile
manner provided by law. The unexecuted intention of a testator to revoke his will is of no consequence, and an unaccomplished attempt of a
testator to destroy or revoke his will is equally
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futile."
In Re Johannes' Estate 227 P2d 138, (Kans.
1951). Gregory v. Susong, 205 SW 2d 6 (Tenn).
95 Corpus Juris Secundum on Wills, Sections
270 and 280 b (1).
To some extent, Chapter 2 of Title 74 in the first
section may shed some light on this matter: It reads:

"A will is to be construed according to the intention of testator. Where his intention cannot
have effect to its full extent, it must effect it as
far as possible."
There are many cases in which the Supreme Court of
Utah has interpreted this rule, including In Re Baum's
Estate, 4 Utah 2nd 375, 294 P 2d 711, all of which at·
tempt to give effect to the intent of the testator. How·
ever, it is the belief of the undersigned that none of these
cases squarely answer the question before this court.
Again, in text this item is answered. Corpus Juris
Secundum, Vol. 95, Section 266 of Wills, on Page 32 per·
taining to intention to revoke, makes the following
statement:
,•

"Iri order to effect revocation, there must be a
GQncurrence of an act which may operate as a
revocation and an intention to revoke, such inbeing essential and indispensable."
In the body of the section, the following statement
is made on Page 33:
"Thus, in determining whether a will has been
revoked by a subsequent writing or action by
the testator, it is always the intention of the
testator that must govern, and when that is
clearly apparent it must operate, provided the
intent is consummated ... "
The section goes on to the effect that mutilation, can·
cellation, or destruction indicates that mere physical de-
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struction, even though complete, is not sufficient until
there is an accompanying intention therefor. Also, in
line with 99 A.L.R. 524, this section of Corpus Juris Secundum on Page 34 makes the statement:
"On the other hand, if the testator has knowledge of the mutilation of his will, and, with intention to revoke, accepts such mutilation as a
destruction of the will, this has been held to
amount to a revocation. It is not sufficient that
the will is burnt, torn, cancelled, obliterated, or
destroyed with the intention of altering it, but
the act must be with the intent and for the purpost of revocation."
Section 280 of Wills, Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.
95, pertaining to an act of destruction, mutilation, or
cancellation, commencing at Page 61 and continuing
thereafter, indicates that complete destruction is not
required. On Page 62 the following statement is made:
"The slightest act of tearing or cutting with intent to revoke the whole will is sufficient for
such a purpose. The retention of the part torn
from the will does not affect the revocatory
effect of the tearing."
On Page 63 the same is indicated pertaining to burning. Also on Page 63 the same is indicated pertaining
to cancellation or obliteration. The entire matter seems
to hinge on some sort of an overt act together with an
intent. Certainly when one considers that destroying
011c or two or more duplicate or indentical wills revokes
them all, it is the intent of the testator that governs this.
In this particular matter, there is no question of intent,
and there is no question of an overt act.
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Point III
MRS. PETERSON MADE STATEMENTS THAT
SHE HAD DESTROYED HER WILL.
After the overt act, as testified to by Mrs. Rollo,
Mrs. Peterson made statements to two independent witnesses that she had destroyed her will. As a matter of
law, had someone else destroyed the will, and then Mrs.
Peterson ratified their act by making similar statements
to two independent witnesses that the will had been
destroyed by a third party and that she was ratifying
the destruction and using it as a revocation of her will,
this would have been an effective revocation of the will.
This would be true even though she had not had knowledge of the destruction at the time of the destruction of
the will. At the same time, had someone else destroyed it,
or had she destroyed it accidentally without the intent
to destroy same, there is no question that it could have
been proven by an unsigned copy thereof by showing
that destruction had been effected, but it was not intentional. However, we have a different situation. We have
the destruction coupled with the intent. There is no
question that if there was a duplicate will and it was
destroyed, by statute the original was revoked as well
as the duplicate. This, Judge Day found to be the situation and made a proper order accordingly. However, if
there was only an original of the will, what is the intent
of the testator, and what is the necessary overt act to
accomplish revocation? If the will has been purloined
and another document placed in the envelope, or, if the
will has been misplaced and the testator places something else in the envelope and forgets that she has misplaced the will, and in either event, without examination
the testator later destroys same saying that this is her
will and she intends to destroy it and does destroy it,
and does burn the envelope and the document, is this
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not a revocation of the will? The appellant thinks it is.
CONCLUSION
The intent to revoke a will followed by the revocation of a duplicate, if there was a duplicate, and an overt
act that the testator thought was the burning of her will,
if there was not a duplicate, certainly should amount to
a revocation.
Respectfully submitted,
PATRICK H. FENTON
Attorney for Appellant,
Shirley B. Higbee

